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Introduction
New technologies are often essential to the effort of enterprises to
become more competitive. How the technology is introduced, in particular,
how labor-management issues are handled, will strongly influence whether
the new technology makes its potential contribution. The purpose of this
paper is to outline briefly what we have learned over the past decade about
this subject.
We need to distinguish at the outset between two broad work-force
management strategies, because what we have been learning applies more to
one of these strategies than the other. We label one of these strategies
"mutual compliance" and the other "mutual commitment." (Walton, 1987a)
We propose that these alternative approaches to workforce management
influence the design of technology as well as the way it is implemented.
Conversely, we propose that the design and implementation of new technology
can be a powerful force toward either a compliance or commitment
organization.
The traditional employment relationship assumes no more than employer
and employee compliance. Each agrees to comply with certain terms of
employment, either prescribed or tacitly understood. Under mutual
compliance employees are expected to give a fair day's effort for a fair
day's pay and management is expected to supervise this bargain in a firm
but fair manner. Mutual commitment goes well beyond such a traditional
arrangement. The employee becomes committed to the organization and its
goals, which is matched by additional commitment by the employer to the
employee's welfare. Employee commitment takes many forms, including
initiative to improve quality, reduction of scrap and other waste, and an
increase in the productivity of their own labor. Similarly, the
organization's commitment to workers can be expressed in a variety of ways,
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including strong employment assurances, opportunities to participate in
decisions, and-programs for training and retraining.
Many organizations continue to rely upon control and compliance
techniques that have been perfected over many decades--clear demarcations
between planning and executing, narrow and deskilled jobs, individual
accountability, standards of minimum performance, close supervision, and
labor, in general, treated as a variable cost. While these techniques often
are depersonalizing and demotivating, their adverse effects may be minimal
in practical terms; moreover under control conditions, the organization has
circumscribed its dependence on the competence and internal motivation of
the individual. Therefore, some corporations and government agencies still
regard mutual compliance as the most practical approach available to them
for managing at least a fraction of their work force.
While a few companies have practiced mutual commitment for many
decades, the trend toward relying upon policies that elicit employee
commitment and less on ones that impose control really began in the early
1970's, as management sought to extend to other workers an approach long
idealized in relations with the professional work force--challenging work,
self-supervision, open communication, and mutual influence. In effect,
labor is treated as a resource to be developed rather than as a variable
cost.
The above distinctions are important for the present discussion of new
technology. The choice between contrasting management strategies--control
versus commitment--will determine the labor relations dynamics that will be
encountered in the process of introducing new technology, and therefore the
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steps that are appropriate in order to make the process as constructive as
possible. Also, some of the new work place technologies, especially those
utilizing advanced information technologies, usually can be exploited
significantly better with the mutual commitment approach than with control
and compliance. Therefore, while we will also discuss the dynamics and
techniques associated with new technology introduced into a stable
framework of mutual compliance, we will emphasize situations where
management is attempting to initiate or strengthen a commitment
organization.
Mutual compliance is found in both non-unionized and unionized
companies. Similarly, mutual commitment is being pursued in companies that
do not deal with unions as well as those that do. Often the mutual
commitment approach is jointly sponsored by management and union.
Management's approach to its work force, which we have been
discussing, and its strategy for dealing with unions are closely related.
Beginning in the mid-1970's, American management's strategies toward unions
developed along two contrasting paths. One strategy attempts to weaken the
union, permitting management to manage as it sees fit. The other strategy
attempts to expand the area of cooperation between management and the
union.
These two strategies are alternative approaches to the same compelling
problem confronted by management--a lack of competitiveness. Management's
predicament is aptly portrayed in the framework in Figure 1. (Walton
1987b.) Consider that management's relations with its union can be either
adversarial or cooperative (or some point on the spectrum defined by these
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end points) and that the union can either have high relative power (meaning
it can effectively prevent management from doing much of what it would like
to do) or low power. Union-management relations in many American
industries had become firmly established in the adversarial/high union
power quadrant during the 1950s and 1960s. As long as American auto makers
and steel companies, for example, were only competing with other domestic
producers who had similar labor relations, this condition created no
serious competitive problems. However, once these companies confronted
tough foreign competitors in the U.S. market, their managements began to
recognize that the combination of powerful unions and adversarial relations
was a non-competitive position.
Two routes are available to escape this condition. The first is to
attempt to weaken the unions' power and accept the possibility that
adversarial attitudes may be intensified, at least for a period of time.
This route is best dramatized by an example outside the private sector,
namely President Reagan's actions to break the air traffic controller
strike and the PATCO union, but it also is exemplified by actions taken by
Continental Airlines, Phelps Dodge, Greyhound, and perhaps U.S.X.
The second escape route is for management to accept the union's
strength and to attempt to transform the relationship into one that
emphasizes the parties' mutual interests to strengthen the competitiveness
of the enterprise. This strategy has generally characterized the relations
in recent years between Ford and the UAW, LTV and USW, ATT and CWA, and
Xerox and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile workers (ACTWV) - to cite
several examples.
Different advantages and disadvantages are associated with these
contrasting strategies. By attempting to confront and prevail over the
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union, management usually seeks deep economic concessions and work rule
changes. However, the adversarial climate usually is not conducive to
initiatives by management to enlist employees in other productivity
improvement activities. In contrast, by attempting to structure
collaborative relations with its union, management hopes that it can
implement commitment policies and practices and enlist the spontaneous
cooperation of employees in performance improvement activities. With this
strategy economic concessions and formal work rule changes usually are
relatively modest, at least in the short term.
The Mutual Compliance/Adversarial Scenario
Certain patterns characterize the introduction of new technology into
companies which adhere to a mutual compliance approach for at least part of
its work force and which accept an adversarial relationship with the union,
if one is present. (Walton 1985.) Managers tend to be preoccupied by
technical and economic criteria and deal with social issues only if and
when the reactions of employees or unions require action. Unions attempt
to impose conditions on implementation in order to limit the technology's
adverse effect on the work force; e.g., slowing the introduction to
ameliorate employment effects, grieving working conditions for health and
safety reasons, enforcing bidding procedures to protect traditional
seniority rights, and protesting technology-based monitoring in order to
reduce job pressure.
Responding to--or anticipating--employee and union resistance,
management adds social control to the other criteria that shape the design
of new technology and generally intensifies the adversarial battle over
managerial prerogatives. Management finds itself in one or both of the
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self-reinforcing cycles depicted in Figure 2. In mutual compliance
situations, managements tend to hold pessimistic assumptions about workers'
motivations and skills. These assumptions lead management to develop
technologies that deskill and routinize work, which in turn generate worker
apathy or antagonism, thereby justifying management's earlier assumptions
and its control strategy. The development of intense adversarial labor
relations in many unionized companies has reinforced the dynamics
surrounding technology design. An assumption of adversarial relations by
management leads it to pursue objectives and utilize tactics that increase
the union's tendency to challenge and constrain management actions.
Each of the two self-reinforcing loops depicted in Figure 2 is
robust by itself, but in combination, they are especially formidable. For
example, preoccupied with its position in an adversarial union
relationship, management will be especially interested in work technology
that deskills jobs, controls workers more closely, and permits the removal
of tasks from members of the bargaining unit, because these effects will
increase management's operational flexibility and minimize certain labor
relations "hassles."
By way of elaboration, the dynamics associated with mutual compliance
and adversarial relations lead to the following patterns of work-technology
development:
First, in the design of new work technology, jobs tend to be
deskilled, fragmented, and routinized. This increases management's control
over the work force, but the new jobs also demoralize employees and limit
the positive contribution they can make to service and cost effectiveness.
Second, as new technology is designed and implemented, the full
potential of retraining employees is seldom realized, even though such
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retraining could be advantageous to both the company and the employees. In
addition, management fears that contract provisions will force them to fill
positions with unqualified persons.
Third, the design of new technology sometimes moves tasks out of the
bargaining unit. This shift may give management certain tactical
labor-relations advantages, but it assigns to professionals and supervisors
work that neither uses nor develops their potential and takes away from
workers in the bargaining unit some work that would have utilized and
developed their potential.
Fourth, electronic monitoring capabilities are built into the work
system that may ensure achievement of minimum performance but that
discourage workers from providing any more than the minimum.
What advice can be given to planners of new technology where the
employee-management relationship is for some reason locked into a mutual
compliance pattern and the union relationship, if one exists, is locked in
an adversarial mode? In a competitive business environment it is still in
the interests of all parties to make effective use of new technology. It
is clearly in management's interest to minimize employee resistance to the
new technology.
The ingredients of effective introduction of technology in this
scenario include (1) careful communication by management of the competitive
rationale for the technology and the implementation plans; and (2)
practical compromises that respond to workers' major concerns, such as
advance notice and buffering the employment and income effects of the
technology, and at the same time ensuring that workers comply with major
operational priorities, such as the staffing patterns for new technology.
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Another ingredient is adequate training of the users to operate the
new technology. Certainly, training is a key intervention for the mutual
commitment/cooperation scenario that we will consider shortly. But
training also serves an important function in the mutual compliance
situation, namely, to set the stage for holding the workers accountable for
specified results because they have been instructed in the relevant
knowledge to operate the new equipment.
Most fundamentally, however, we advise managements and unions
presently in the compliance/adversarial scenario to continue to explore the
feasibility of moving in the direction of mutual commitment and
cooperation. The reasons for this recommendation become apparent in the
next discussion of the commitment/cooperation scenario.
The Mutual Commitment/Cooperation Scenario
Advanced information technology, which is integral to most new work
technologies today, is strengthening management's incentives for creating a
commitment organization. (NRC, 1986; Walton and Susman, 1987; and Zuboff,
1988). The nature of computer-based work technology has been changing in a
way that places a higher premium on an internally motivated and
intellectually competent workforce. The trend has been away from
automation applications that simply substitute capital for labor toward
more complex applications that augment the role of labor in the production
process or the delivery of services.
Computer-based work systems primarily oriented to cost reduction often
attempt to automate as completely as possible functions previously
performed by individuals. In contrast, systems oriented to adding value
(by increasing effectiveness or generating new products) often emphasize a
11
- 9 -
dynamic interaction between the technology and its users, including the
generation of new information by the system to be used in cognitively
complex ways by the users. Zuboff (1985) has referred to these options as
"the two faces of intelligent technology" and labelled them "automate" and
"informate." By automate she means: "The application of technology that
increases the self-acting, self-regulating, and self-correcting capacities
of systems." In contrast, informate means "The application of technology
that translates objects, events, and processes into data and displays that
data." She has demonstrated in a convincing way how these two technology
strategies have profound implications for the nature of work and power
relations in industrial society. (Zuboff, 1988.)
Sharply different types of organizational requirements are associated
with different forms of information technology. Technology that is almost
exclusively designed to automate operations usually reduces both headcount
and the dependence of the production system on the judgements of the
remaining operators. It is likely to reduce the amount of training
operators needs. Under these conditions of automation adequate performance
can often continue to be obtained by close supervision and control oriented
organizational rewards and punishments.
A contrasting organization is needed when new technology is designed
not only to automate certain functions (including storing, retrieving, and
manipulating information) but also, and more importantly, to provide
operators with new forms of information to ugrade their decisions and the
goods and services they produce. For this type of technology to be
operated effectively, the human resource policies and practices must elicit
a high level of spontaneous commitment, provide for higher level cognitive
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skills, and encourage substantial influence on the part of those who
operate the new system.
A case in point is computer integrated manufacturing (CIM). A
National Research Council (NRC) committee composed of executives, labor
leaders, and academics and chaired by one of the authors studied human
resource practices in 16 state-of-the-art installations of advanced
manufacturing technology in the United States. A majority of these
installations were computer integrated manufacturing systems. The
committee found that certain features of this advanced technology make a
number of high commitment practices especially appropriate. For example,
elements of the manufacturing system become more closely coupled with CIM
technology. The tighter interdependence of tasks makes broader jobs and
more flexible assignment patterns extremely advantageous. In addition, the
more integrated the system, the more alert and ready to act workers must
be. Therefore, it is crucial that workers be internally motivated.
As indicated earlier, close supervision can compensate for lack of
motivation where the technology involves repetitive, short-cycle
activities, but it cannot obviate the need for individual responsibility in
the complex CIM environment. Fortunately, the increased capital intensity
of CIM and the smaller crew typically required to operate it make it easier
for management to devote the time and resources to develop high commitment.
Therefore the advanced forms of computer-based work technology are
more effectively exploited by commitment organizations. Many forms of
advanced information technology not only depend for their effectiveness
upon users who are internally motivated, but they must be designed and
managed in a way that elicits that type of motivation. Advanced
information technologies not only benefit directly from an operator's
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understanding of the unit's business; they also can impart such
understanding. These technologies not only require continuous learning;
they also promote and reinforce it.
However, whether these potentially positive relationships between a
general commitment orientation of the organization and the new technology
are realized depends upon how the technology is introduced and managed.
The following are offered as constructive practices.
Articulate Organizational Ideals. In an increasing number of
corporations top management has formulated a vision of the type of
organization which it believes will enable the corporation to compete. For
example, these visions often call for some combination of the following:
fewer levels of management, delegation of decisions to the lowest level
where information and expertise can be provided, more teamwork, more
entrepreneurial spirit, more self-supervision, and a stronger customer
service orientation. It is our contention that a new technology can either
promote or frustrate the movement toward some of these ideals, depending on
how it is designed and managed.
The existence of an explicit statement of ideals, whether it is called
a management philosophy or an organizational vision, can serve as a set of
social criteria to guide the development of new technological systems.
These social criteria can be applied in the approval and assessment
processes in a way similar to technical specifications and economic
justification.
Unfortunately, even corporate organizations that have clearly
articulated philosophies and use them to drive quality-of-work life efforts
and other organizational development activities seldom ensure that they are
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applied in the design and implementation of new technology. Thus, in the
early 19 80's when ATT was trying to revise its managerial style to be less
controlling, and was sponsoring QWL activities jointly with the
Communications Workers of American (CWA), the Bell Labs and ATT central
staffs were designing automated technologies and computer-aided
administrative systems that ran counter to these new ideals. The
automation deskilled, routinized, and paced workers and more closely
monitored their behavior. Such an experience is not atypical. American
managers and union officials generally have been slow to appreciate that
technological choice is social choice. They fail to appreciate that many
technical solutions exist for a given economic problem, and that each
technical solution has a unique set of social consequences. Therefore,
education about the relationship between organizational and technological
choices is needed for line managers, systems developers, human resource
managers, and union officials. Both private and public sector institutions
should give priority to responding to this need for new understanding of
these important relationships.
Address Threshold Issues. Certain issues are often so crucial in
determining the response of employees and their representatives to new
technology that they should be addressed in policy terms, ideally in
advance of any specific new technology project.
The first threshold issue is employment security. No other aspect of
the context for implementing new technology is more important than the
presence or absence of assurances about employment. Workers hold similar
concerns whether we are talking about non-union or unionized workplaces,
although the presence of a union usually ensures that employment security
III
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issues and their relationship to new technology are addressed more
explicitly. The NRC study concluded that "to build and preserve human
commitment and skills required to operate advance manufacturing technology,
the policies that govern employment security and ease labor dislocations
must be as favorable as the competitive circumstances of the enterprise
permit." (p.4) Robert Zager's paper in this series, "Continuous Learning
and Employment Security", outlines innovative practices in this area.
During the 1980's we have seen the evolution of a number of key
principles re employment security in several bell weather collective
bargaining agreements. In the auto industry the employers have agreed to
the premise that no layoffs should occur as a result of the introduction of
new technology. Management has been willing to agree to this principle
since it can control the pace of technological change and the displacement
effects for the workforce can be planned for and handled via a variety of
redeployment efforts involving job banks, retraining, transfer and even out
placement to work in other industries.
Another principle that has emerged recently in some labor agreements
is that before work is moved out of the bargaining unit (e.g.,
subcontracting, shift to overseas operations, etc.), the workers whose jobs
are at risk should be given a chance to form task forces to study the
situation and to formulate a restructuring plan for their operations so the
in house costs come within range of the competitive benchmarks. Xerox and
the ACTWU have followed this procedure with the result that a number of
departments have "saved their jobs".
A second threshold issue occurs in a unionized context. It relates to
the effect of new technology on the bargaining unit. New technology often
changes the nature of work so fundamentally that it creates ambiguities
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about whether the new tasks are appropriately placed within or outside the
bargaining unit.
Recall that in the adversarial scenario both parties view the
introduction of new technology as an opportunity to redefine the effective
scope of the bargaining unit in their favor. In the cooperative scenario
they are more likely to address other issues without emphasizing where work
ends up in relation to the bargaining unit. For example, if management is
otherwise trying to delegate functions to lower levels of the organization,
it may willingly move new activities such as programming and new
decision-making responsibilities into the work of bargaining unit members.
Similarly, if some computerized functions previously performed by
bargaining unit members are now more naturally packaged electronically in
the work f supervisory or professional personnel, the union is relaxed
about that outcome.
This can be a highly sensitive issue. The important point is to
recognize that management's willingness to embrace more work in the
bargaining unit depends in part upon the prospects for union-management
cooperation; and that the union's readiness to enter into a cooperative
relationship depends upon management actions that respect the integrity of
the bargaining unit.
As the traditional demarcation lines between blue collar, white
collar, and professional work become blurred a number of tension points and
opportunities are presented to the parties. In an instrument factory
studied by one of the authors where a compliance pattern existed the
following sequence occurred. When first generation technology was ordered
from the vendor, the breakin and customizing was performed by the
operators, all members of the IAM local. As more specialized and advanced
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equipment began to be introduced, the company found it necessary to perform
the customizing work in house but decided to have it be performed by
specialists located in the "model shop" - not a part of the bargaining
unit. Conceivably, the equipment operators could have been trained in the
advanced skill areas of electronics and optics but the company chose to
maintain (and even intensify) the adversarial relationship with the union -
in part, because this was the only unionized plant of this multi-plant
company and the corporate approach emphasized containment (and if possible
shrinkage) of union influence.
Contrast this example with the experience of Cummins Engine and its
independent white collar union. With the same trends mentioned above more
and more work was naturally falling within the domain of engineering
associates, a position not normally within the bargaining unit of
technicians. The solution reached by the parties was to include the
engineering associate position in the bargaining unit (a gain for the
union) but not cover it with the existing bargaining contract provisions (a
gain for management). (Cappelli and Sherer, forthcoming.)
Initiate a Constructive Climate. Many steps in addition to those
described above can serve to create a climate generally favorable to the
introduction of new technology. We will discuss several.
Employment security may relieve some of the anxiety associated with
technological change, but many employees are anxious about their ability to
operate in the new computer-based environment. An IBM facility with which
the authors are familiar provides an example where management either
encouraged or supported a large fraction of the work force to become
educated about the information technologies that would in the future become
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the bases for new work processes and jobs. The positive motivational
effect of this education was at least as important as the enhanced
competence it produced. Motivation and competence were, of course, both
important dimensions of the social context for the specific new technology
projects.
Some of the most powerful initiatives for creating a social context
favorable to new technology are those that involve employees directly in
problem-solving activities designed to improve the working environment and
performance. These activities, encouraged under such umbrella concepts as
quality of work life (QWL), employee involvement (EI), participative
management, and quality circles, help develop the increased social and
cognitive skills and the attitudes of self-confidence and self-reliance
that will contribute to effective use of the new technology. Naturally
these positive effects occur only when the activities reflect the genuine
commitment of management to the spirit of participation, are also sponsored
by the union if one is present, and are accompanied by other supportive
changes such as training. The value of establishing a pattern of employee
participation as a prelude to the effective introduction of new technology
was confirmed by the NRC study and has been demonstrated in other
experiences of GM, Ford, ATT, Cummins Engine, with which the authors are
familiar.
Management initiatives to change its relationship with unions usually
must occur in parallel with those designed to involve employees.
Illustrative are the Common Interest Forum (CIF) initiated in a number of
union-management relationships, including those involving UAW with GM and
Ford and the CWA with ATT.
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In the case of ATT and CWA the parties agreed in 1983 to institute
CIFs in the many separate entities of the Bell System. The forums have
been used in practice to varying degrees. The CIF at Pacific Bell became a
major vehicle in 1985 and 1986 for jointly addressing employment security
issues and for expressing a new "business partnership" between the parties.
(Kanter, 1988). Local CIFs were established to deal with other matters
including the introduction of technology. The CIF was also the setting for
developing joint ATT-CWA training and retraining efforts, finalized in one
form in the 1986 collective bargaining agreement as a non-profit
organization, The Alliance for Employee Growth and Development. AT&I
committed $7 million per year to the Alliance.
Based on these and other similar experiences, the CWA Executive Board
Committee reviewed the general requirements for moving its relations with
management from adversarialism to cooperation and the specific
contributions that CIFs can make, and concluded:
This cooperation between union and management depends in large
part on management's attitude to the union. Cooperation must be a
two-way street. Just as the union leadership must.understand and
respect the company's need to remain profitable and competitive, so
the company must understand and respect the union's need to further
the goals of members and to organize new members. Companies cannot
form non-union subsidiaries at the same time they expect the union to
support their competitive strategies. Both company and union need to
trust each other so that management does not undermine the union and
the union does not hold mutually beneficial programs hostage to
collective bargaining demands.
Ongoing Common Interest Forum discussions can build understanding and
deal with differences in a non-adversarial manner. The union will be
better able to serve its members and help the company's position if it
has an early knowledge of and a voice in company strategies that
affect employment, work processes, and life on the job. This requires
that union leaders talk directly to the line managers who make these
decisions before they are made. This cannot be achieved if the union
related only to the Labor Relations department. While management
leaders in Labor Relations took the lead in bringing the union
together with line managers, he CIFs must include line managers. In
similar fashion at local levels, the CIF works only when local CWA
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leaders develop a working relationship with line management. (CWA
Resolution, April 14, 1988. p. 4.)
A concrete example of how the common interest forum approach works in
practice comes out of the experience of Pacific Northwest Bell and the CWA.
The position of systems technician had experienced considerable change as a
result of new technology and testing procedures. The initial approach to
upgrading skills emphasized individual learning with a battery of tapes and
learning modules. A number of technicians expressed via the work relations
survey a need for a different approach to new skill acquisition. As a
result a task force was created consisting of technicians appointed by CWA,
line managers, and representatives from the local vocational educational
system. As a result of the recommendation of this group a
telecommunications course was started on company time for any technicians
who volunteered. It has been very successful and a follow up course has
been launched. (Hilton and Straw, 1987.)
Management sometimes uses improvements in the union relationship as a
criterion for deciding whether to invest in new technology in a particular
plant. It may also use the prospect of the investment to induce the union
to agree to special conditions favorable to the implementation of the new
technology. For example, when Allen-Bradley started up a computer
integrative manufacturing (CIM) facility in April 1985 to manufacture
contactors and relays, it wanted to manage the system with innovative
organizational and human resource practices. (Goldstein and Klein, 1987).
UE officials agreed to give management carte blanche in designing the CIM
work organization during the pilot stage of the project because they wanted
to encourage the company to place new technology in established unionized
locations rather than greenfield sites. The parties subsequently agreed to
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such matters as jobs classifications and selection procedures when the
system was moved from the development unit to the production department
where it was covered by the union contract.
This arrangement between Allen-Bradley and the UE illustrates another
condition helpful to the introduction of new technology, namely a
willingness to give planners space to experiment and learn. In this case,
both management and the union could withhold judgement about what
departures from their conventional working arrangements--job
classifications, flexibility of assignments, pay systems, and selection
criteria and procedures--would be operationally desirable and politically
acceptable. They could learn from experience the operational advantages of
certain practices and workers' reactions to them before deciding which of
them to institutionalize for the CIM system.
The Allen-Bradley example also illustrates the reciprocal relationship
between technology and social variables, in this case the tenor of
union-management relations. The introduction of new technology is
certainly influenced by the extent of cooperative labor-management
relations - but the major event or the occasion of new technology also
provides an opportunity to create new arrangements and understandings which
help elaborate mutual commitment that may only be at a formative stage.
Structure Participative Planning, Implementation, and Assessment.
User involvement has long received at least lip service by technology
developers. The concept is being broadened to call for the participation
of not only users but other stakeholders in the process, and not only in
implementatior activities but also in the design process. Participation
can take many forms, as the examples below illustrate.
III
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The NRC study found that employees are sometimes involved as early as
the selection br adoption decision of technology. At five unionized sites
included in the NRC study workers or union officials accompanied engineers
on trips to vendors and rendered opinions on what equipment to buy.
Employees and union representatives also were consulted on how to operate
the equipment and how to organize the work.
When the union is consulted early in the technology development
process, it is more likely to become an advocate for the new technology,
reassuring union members that the technology will secure more jobs than it
threatens. Union officials who participate in the selection or preliminary
implementation process do this recognizing that they may be taking
political risks in order to serve the long term interests of their members.
Since new technology may increase the job evaluation point value of
the impacted jobs, some union leaders are reluctant to become involved at
the design stage for new technology for fear they will become co-opted and
unable to represent member interests when the bargaining issues come on the
table.
At Boeing this dilemma was resolved by instituting an annual
technology briefing for top IAM officials. Long term trends in CAD/CAM,
robotics, and composite materials were dealt with in these annual sessions.
However, for specific technology projects union officials were not involved
at the strategic stage, thereby leaving them free to pursue the
distributive issues of staffing and pay levels.
Deal with Potential Constraints. We have mentioned the many aspects
of the organization that may need to be redesigned--including jobs, pay
schemes, selection procedures, training, structure, and performance
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management. The ideal organization can be introduced readily in a
greenfield site with a new work force in a favorable labor market. More
typically new technologies are introduced into more constrained
environments requiring adaptations. We treat here how constraints may be
imposed by union contracts on the one hand and the existing skills and
attitudes of supervisors on the other.
Unions often limit to some extent the flexibility that is otherwiss
appropriate for operating new technology, precluding for example the
integration of operating and maintenance work. The union principle of
seniority also often constrains the selection process. Where the
technology raises skill demands, increases capital intensity, and renders
the system more sensitive to mistakes, effective utilization of
manufacturing technology is more dependent than ever on selecting the best
talent available for operating positions.
In some cases management has been unable to negotiate change in the
traditional way ability and seniority are balanced. An appliance plant's
procedures are typical of facilities where management introduced only
modest changes.- The managers classified the new, multiskilled operator
position above other jobs--in part to minimize bumping during layoffs--but
they instituted no new selection procedures. Accordingly, they encountered
problems when the new pay rate for this job attracted 50 bids for the first
6 positions--many from applicants who lacked the basic verbal and
quantitative skills to absorb the training.' The labor contract mandated
training for the senior employees who bid on the job, however, so
management's only screening option was to spell out the job's multiple
duties ard encourage self-selection. Although about half the applicants
withdrew, the managers realized that in the future they would need to
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negotiate a change in the selection process so that the most proficient
operators woula have a chance at the training.
The NRC study found more innovative selection processes in other
unionized plants. At an axle plant, for example, applicants for skilled
jobs completed an eight-hour assessment of their technical and
interpersonal skills, conducted by a local community college. They were
given a four-to six-hour skill-level inventory, which included simulated
problem-solving exercises, and then attended a family night with their
spouses to discuss the program. The 45 applicants who remained from an
initial group of 100 were then ranked by seniority. Some of them declined
the new jobs; 16 were eventually placed. Many dropped out because working
in the new plant involved shift work or demanded higher performance
standards than they were prepared to accept. Others declined because they
felt unqualified or had only a few years to go before retirement and did
not want to waste the company's investment.
A unionized diesel engine plant devised a multistep process in which
the 250 initial applicants were divided into small groups and given a
four-hour briefing on the technology and the new job's duties and
expectations. Those who persisted were interviewed by a committee of two
manufacturing supervisors and two union representatives. The union
representatives went out of their way to warn applicants how different the
new operation would be and cautioned them to reflect on their interests and
aptitudes. Taking the interview results into account, as well as
attendance records, seniority, experience, and any evaluation records, the
same committee made the final selection.
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The general point is that managements and unions can devise ways to
consider criteria other than seniority without losing workers' confidence
in the fairness of the selection process.
Another juncture for these creative arrangements arises when workforce
reductions are required. At an auto plant with a CIM system the parties
worked out a procedure whereby senior workers could not bump CIM system
operators, but would "back fill" positions vacated by individuals who were
on a "qualifiable" list - in turn the latter moved into the unit to
displace the junior people who would then be placed on layoff.
The unions involved pursued these innovations because union officials,
as much as their counterparts in management, appreciated the importance of
selecting people who would be able to perform well. They understood that
the effectiveness of the new technology--and thus the plant's
competitiveness--would depend on the performance of the operators. And
they were concerned about wasting money training the wrong people.
Supervisors' predispositions can be as much a constraint on the
effective utilization of certain technologies as the union contract.
We have emphasized the importance of a set of organizational ideals to
guide technology development. However, even if the system is designed to
be managed in a prescribed way, there is no guarantee the managers actually
in charge of the system will manage in the intended spirit. An aspect of
the organization that is especially susceptible to differing managerial
predispositions is the approach to performance management.
In a case involving a decision support system for paper machine
operators, which gave them the cost information and process expertise they
needed to operate with more atonomy, supervisors of the operators felt
threatened by their loss of relative power and began to use the monitoring
[II
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capacity of the system to tighten their supervisory control. (Bronsema
and Zuboff, 1984.)
A study of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) implementation of its
Automated Collection System (ACS) by Chalykoff (1988) found that
supervisors differed in terms of their use of the computer-aided-monitoring
feature of the ACS. This feature enabled supervisors to monitor an
employee's terminal work and phone interactions with taxpayers. Some
supervisors tended to use this capacity in ways that developed employees,
while others used it in ways that made employees feel controlled and
subjugated. These patterns reflected the dispositions of supervisors,
dispositions that would be influential even if the ACS planners had been
more prescriptive about how the monitoring capacity was to be used.
In another technology introduction at IRS - the issuance of lap top
computers to 14,000 examiners - the Treasury Workers' Union insisted on an
agreement that use or lack of use of the new PC's could not be considered
in performance appraisals. While such a policy was understandable given
the union's concerns that supervisors might exert undue pressure on the
examiners to use the new tool, such a restriction is certainly untenable
for the long run and illustrates a generally adversarial relationship and
lack of involvement by the union in the early phases of decision making
regarding new technology.
Thus the paper mill and IRS cases underscore the need for




The curreht scene presents many opportunities for introducing new
technology via constructive labor relations. It was only several decades
ago that a number of unions actively opposed new technology or at best
sought to control its introduction with various work rules and crew size
requirements. Today, such stories by unions are much more the exception.
Some relationships remain locked in an adversarial mode that prevents
the realization of the full benefits of new technology but this is due as
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Attempt to weaken union power in order to secure deep economic
and work rule concessions; and accept adversarial relations.
Attempt to generate a cooperative relationship with union in order
to support participative improvements in quality and productivity;
and accept that economic concessions and formal work rule
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